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The Role of the Federal Judiciary in the 
Development of Federalism in West Germany 
and the United States 
by Richard Davis* 
D.jeffrey Burnham** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Federalism has been defined as a division of powers between two levels of 
government. 1 Conflict resolution between these two levels has become the role 
of the judiciary in many federal systems. The role of the judiciary in resolving 
conflicts between the federal and state or provincial governments, however, may 
differ across national systems according to historical, political, and legal factors. 
If that role can be generalized, it would be useful in explaining and predicting 
the role of courts in the development of federalism in other federal states. 
This article e~amines the role of the federal judiciary in the early development 
of federalism in two systems-the Federal Republic of Germany and the United 
States-and assesses the similarity or dissimilarity in roles. Additionally, this 
article see\<s to demonstrate the effect of these roles on the nature of decisions 
concerning federalism. 
These two systems have been selected because in both nations the federal 
judiciary was called upon to help define the federal relationship. Majordecisions 
on federalism during the respective early periods were offered by the respective 
supreme judicial tribunals, which strongly impacted the evolution of the federal 
relationship. Emphasis is placed on the early period because of the presumption 
that reliance on precedent gives early decisions greater importance in defining 
the new and malleable federal relationship. The period under study for the 
United States consists of a time span from 1789 to the 1820s. For the Federal 
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Republic, the period is the decade from 1951 to 1961-the initial years of the 
Federal Republic and the Federal Constitutional Court. 
II. THE UNITED STATES 
Article III of the Constitution extends judicial power to "one Supreme Court, 
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish" to settle controversies between states and, indirectly, between the states 
and the national government.2 This provision, by implication, empowered the 
Supreme Court to review and refine the nature of federalism on an ongoing 
basis. The conceptualization and implementation of federalism has been highly 
influenced by the decisions of the Court. 
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution details the powers of the Congress, 
including the necessary and proper clause. 3 Section 9 of the same article lists 
powers denied to the national government, while section 10 enumerates those 
functions denied to the states.' The reserve clause in the tenth amendment 
expressly reserves all unnamed areas of governance to the states or to the 
people.5 By the early nineteenth century, this demarcation of powers was being 
challenged by the national government and the states. In case after case the 
Supreme Court was called upon to adjudicate these disputes. The concept of 
judicial review, asserted by the Court in Marbury v. Madison,6 forms the basis for 
the Court's ability to review the constitutionality of a statute and establishes the 
judicial branch as the court of last resort for the settlement of federal disputes. 
Four areas of state-national conflict, or what James Madison referred to as 
"federal" areas, have been selected for review.7 In each, a major early decision 
will be analyzed. The right of the national judiciary to review and reverse 
decisions from state courts is the subject of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee. S The 
preeminence of the Constitution's contract clause is represented by Trustees of 
2 U.S. CON ST. art. III, § 2. The Constitution states in pertinent part: "The judicial Power shall extend 
... to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or 
more States .... " 
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The Constitution states in pertinent part: "The Congress shall have Power 
... To regulate Commerce ... among the several States ... And ... To make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers .... " 
4 U.S. CON ST. art. I, §§ 9, 10. Section 9 states in pertinent part: "No Bill of Attainder or ex post 
facto Law shall be passed ... No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or 
Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another .... " Section 10 states in pertinent part: "No 
State shall enter into any Treaty ... ; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit .... " 
5 U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Constitution states: "The powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people." 
65 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). 
7 THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (J. Madison). 
, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
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Dartmouth College v. Woodward. 9 The impact of the necessary and proper clause 
upon the activities of the states is the primary issue in the case of McCulloch v. 
Maryland. IO The case of Gibbons v. Ogden deals with the scope and application 
of the commerce clause. 11 These cases provide an overriding theme in regard 
to the Court and the early development of federalism. 
A. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee 
Following the death of Lord Fairfax in 1781, lands belonging to him in 
Virginia were left to his nephew, Denny Martin, an English citizen. The Com-
monwealth of Virginia, however, refused to grant Martin title, in conflict with 
a U.s.-Great Britain treaty, and, instead, leased portions of the property to 
David Hunter. The case proceeded slowly through the Virginia state court 
system until 1812 when the state's court of appeals ruled in favor of Hunter. 
The following year, under article 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act, the Supreme 
Court accepted the case.I2 In Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, the Court re-
versed the Virginia decision ordering the title turned over to Martin. 13 The 
state court of appeals, guided by Spencer Roane, rejected the decision and the 
validity of article 25. In his opinion, Roane declined obedience to the writ as 
issued. 14 The case reappeared before the Marshall Court three years later as 
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee. 
Not surprisingly, the Court defended its right to interpret fully the Consti-
tution and all associated laws or decisions. In reference to the lack of clear 
authority for the Court within the text of the Constitution, Justice Story wrote: 
"It did not suit the purposes of the people ... to provide for minute specifi-
cations of powers, or to declare the means by which those powers should be 
carried into execution."15 The Court declared that, due to the vagueness of the 
Constitution and the inability of the Framers to enumerate minute specifications, 
the Court held the burden of interpreting the powers provided to the federal 
government by the Constitution. Also, this responsibility to interpret national 
powers included authority over state legislatures when they conflict with the 
supreme law of the land, in this case treaty law. Because "public mischief" would 
arise if each state legislated without deference to national powers, Story con-
cluded that the Court's appellate jurisdiction extended to state tribunals. 16 
917 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
10 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
1122 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824). 
12 Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, II U.S. (7 Crane h) 603 (1813). 
13 11 U.S. (7 Craneh) at 618-28. 
14 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 306 (1816). 
15/d. at 326. 
16/d. at 348. 
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The Court's rationale for this decision was twofold. First, the Court saw the 
need for "uniformity of decisions" across all the state courts. 17 Second, the 
Constitution was created "for the common and equal benefit of all the people."IB 
Those goals would not be possible if the Court did not have the power to accept 
such cases from the state courts. 
The matter, however, was not put to rest. In Cohens v. Virginia, the Court 
reaffirmed Martin v. Hunter's Lessee. 19 According to Schmid hauser, the Cohens 
decision probably provided more support to the pro-nationalists because Justice 
Marshall, the decision's author, effectively countered the arguments of the active 
states' rights movement of the day.20 
B. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward 
In 1769, the British Crown granted to Eleazer Wheelock a charter to operate 
a private learning institution, Dartmouth College. The charter allowed Whee-
lock, by will, to appoint his own successor at Dartmouth. His son, John Whee-
lock, assumed the presidency of Dartmouth in 1779. By 1812, open conflict 
between Wheelock and the trustees resulted in his removal from office. In 1816, 
the New Hampshire legislature passed measures rendering the old board of 
trustees powerless and converting Dartmouth into a quasi-public institution.21 
The former trustees sued the state to recover corporate property. The trustees 
sought to have the state laws invalidated and the original charter upheld based 
upon the provisions of the 1783 Treaty of Paris with Great Britain. They lost 
before the state court of appeals. The case was brought before the Supreme 
Court in 1816. Marshall wrote the decision in favor of the old board of trustees 
and the federal government's right to protect the viability of all contracts.22 
In the decision, Marshall first defended the Court's right under the Consti-
tution to address the issue of contractual obligations and state law. Marshall 
then narrowed the scope of the case to two critical questions: whether the 
Dartmouth College charter was protected by the Constitution, and whether it 
was further "impaired" by the acts of the state legislature. 23 
Marshall concluded that the College was indeed "eleemosynary" and a "pri-
vate corporation" and that the grant "was plainly a contract" and a "contract 
for the security and disposition of property."24 Therefore, this contract was 
17 [d. at 347-48. 
l' See id. at 351-53. 
19 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 310 (1821). 
20 J. SCHMIDHAUSER, THE SUPREME COURT AS FINAL ARBITER OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 1789-
1957, at 41 (1958). 
21 See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 651-52 (1819). 
22 [d. at 654. 
23 See id. at 651-52. 
24 [d. at 640, 643-44. 
1989] FEDERALISM IN WEST GERMANY AND THE U.S. 67 
protected from state action under the contract clause of the Constitution, which 
prohibits states from making laws which impair the obligation of contracts. 
Marshall added that the legislation clearly substituted the "will of the state" for 
the "will of the donors," thereby altering the obligations created by the grant 
contract.25 The Court overturned the statutes and ordered control of the insti-
tution reverted to the original trustees. This case represents a clear impairment 
of the state's regulatory authority over economic activity, which was reinforced 
in subsequent Marshall Court decisions. 26 
C. McCulloch v. Maryland 
Following the establishment of the second Bank of the United States, Mary-
land attempted to interfere with the bank's operation by placing a heavy annual 
tax on the bank's branches within its borders. McCulloch, an officer of the U.S. 
bank in Maryland, refused to comply and forced the matter to the Supreme 
Court.27 
Writing for the Court, Marshall defended the right of the Congress to estab-
lish a national bank through a loose interpretation of the necessary and proper 
clause in conjunction with provisions in article I, section S.28 This decision 
formalized the principle of implied powers and was defended on the grounds 
that the Congress could not fulfill its expressed powers if denied the choice of 
means for execution of those powers. The Court then turned to the state's right 
to tax the bank and ruled that the state could not engage in activities, such as 
taxation, when the exercise of such power would have the effect of impairing 
the operation of the federal government in carrying out its assigned powers. 29 
The official acceptance of the doctrine of implied powers paved the way for 
a significant expansion of the national government's ability to exercise its powers 
unfettered by state actions. Moreover, the Court opened the door for limiting 
state activities by clearly asserting the supremacy of the federal government in 
fulfilling its powers and rejecting the concurrent nature of state powers when 
state and national laws are in opposition. 
D. Gibbons v. Ogden 
Another landmark decision concerning the development of federalism was 
the case of Gibbons v. Ogden.30 In ISIS, under congressional authorization, 
25 Id. at 652. 
26 Other relevant cases include Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), and Ogden v. 
Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827). 
27 For a general discussion, see G. GUNTHER, JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF "MCCULLOCH V. MARY-
LAND" (1969); R. CUSHMAN, LEADING CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS 59-72 (1971). 
28 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 412-20 (1819). 
29 See id. at 428-30. 
30 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824). 
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Thomas Gibbons began operating a steamboat service between New Jersey and 
New York. Aaron Ogden, who had earlier purchased a license for the route 
under New York law, sought an injunction against the operation of Gibbons's 
service. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the injunction and ordered 
Gibbons to cease operations. 3 ! Gibbons appealed to the Supreme Court, which 
granted certiorari in 1824. 
The Court saw this case as a clear test of the commerce clause. Like its 
decisions in other cases, the Court rejected any strict construction of the Con-
stitution. Marshall wrote: "We cannot perceive the propriety of this strict con-
struction, nor adopt it as a rule by which the Constitution is to be expounded."32 
Critical to the decision was the Court's effort to settle on the meaning of the 
word "commerce."33 The Court interpreted commerce to include navigation 
between the states. Congress, therefore, had the right to regulate any commerce 
that affects or concerns people of more than one state or "nations and parts of 
nations," including the steamboat trade between the states. 34 
Marshall sidestepped the issue of exclusivity in regulation of commerce. In 
the later case of Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., however, Marshall upheld 
the right of state action in the absence of any act by the national government.35 
This decision was a departure from the Marshall Court's ideological direction 
because it did not expand national power. The decision, however, did not 
substantially tilt in the direction of states' rights either, since the supremacy of 
national action, if undertaken, was reinforced. 
These cases provided the foundation for the national government's clear right 
to regulate commerce among the states for the benefit of the nation as a whole. 
Through the Gibbons decision, the Supreme Court continued to expound the 
supremacy of national government powers and resulting legislation over state 
government powers and corresponding legislation. 
E. Summary 
These early decisions demonstrate that the Supreme Court was being called 
upon to playa major role in conflict resolution involving federalism and that 
the Court acted to formalize the interpretation of the relationship between the 
states and the national government. 
III. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
The Federal Republic of Germany is a federal form of government established 
in 1949. The Basic Law, the constitution of the Federal Republic, decreed a 
31 !d. at 1-3. 
32 !d. at 188. 
33 See id. at 197. 
34Id. at 204. 
35 27 U.S. (2 PeL) 245 (1829). 
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rediscovered democracy, dividing powers and functions between the Bund (the 
federal government) and the Lander (regional governments). Under the Basic 
Law, the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) was created as the arbitral power 
to resolve disputes concerning constitutional questions. The FCC functions 
independently of the general jurisdiction courts, in particular the Bundes-
gerichtshof, and of the special jurisdiction courtS.36 
The FCC embodies a unique institution which handles only cases involving a 
constitutional issue. Constitutional review comes to the Court either through an 
individual constitutional complaint37 or from lower courts that refer constitu-
tional questions to the Court whenever such issues arise during the litigation. 38 
In addition, the Basic Law stipulates that the Bund, a Land, or one-third of the 
Bundestag can request that the FCC settle a constitutional dispute. The exercise 
of jurisdiction over such issues is obligatory, and the Court has been very 
detailed in justifying its duty to resolve such disputes and execute its opinions.39 
"By institutionalizing the concept of norm control," states one scholar, "the 
Federal Constitutional Court has broken up [past] rigid interpretation and 
assumed an important directive role vis-a-vis the other powers, notably the 
legislature."4o 
The FCC's major decisions on federalism must be analyzed in light of three 
central legal concepts. First, the supremacy clause in article 31 of the Basic Law 
is fundamental. This states that "[fJederal law overrides Land law."4! Though 
somewhat weaker than the U.S. Constitution's supremacy clause, the West Ger-
man supremacy clause, nonetheless, is vital. The significant weakness is the 
absence of any reference in article 31 to treaties made under federal authority.42 
An example of the effect of this circumstance is the Concordat Case, where the 
FCC held that treaties involving matters over which the federal government has 
no competence are not necessarily binding on the Lander.43 
The second important concept is that involving the great forces of govern-
mental centralization, which take power away from the Lander; here, the FCC 
acts as the system's most important "federalizer."44 As the Lander fail to bring 
36 Weiler, Equal Protection, Legitimacy, and the Legalization of Education: The Role of the Federal Consti-
tutional Court in West Germany, 47 REV. POL. 66, 68 (1985). 
37 See Singer, The Constitutional Court of the German Federal Republic: jurisdiction Over Individual Com-
plaints, 31 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 331, 333-55 (1982). 
38 Von Mehren, Constitutionalism in Germany-The First Decision of the New Constitutional Court, 1 AM. 
J. COMPo L. 70, 75 (1952). 
39 See generally D. KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN WEST GERMANY: A STUDY OF THE FEDERAL CON-
STITUTIONAL COURTS (1976). 
40 Weiler, supra note 36, at 70. 
41 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 31 (W. Ger.). See generally K. VON BEYME, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE 
FEDERAL REpUBLIC OF GERMANY 177 (1979). 
4' Compare GG art. 31 with U.S. CONST. art. IV. 
43 See Kauper, The Constitutions of West Germany and the United States: A Comparative Study, 58 MICH. 
L. REV. 1091, 1149 (1960). 
44 Cole, West German Federalism Revisited, 23 AM. J. COMPo L. 325, 329 (1975). 
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about needed reforms in areas where they have traditionally held competence, 
there emerges an "inexorable push toward the center of Bonn."45 The FCC 
maintains, however, a guarded awareness of this trend, recognizing its duty to 
uphold Basic Law notions of federalism. With its greater judicial activism, the 
Court is recognized as a necessary means of maintaining a federalized balance.46 
Third, the fundamental concept of judicial restraint embodies the theory that 
the FCC should strictly apply the Basic Law with no deviations.47 The FCC, 
being still a young institution, has felt a constant need to prove its legitimacy 
and usefulness.4s It was thought that as the Court followed a rigid set of 
exclusive norms, with little progressiveness, it would receive the necessary re-
spect from other political actors. 49 
This concept of judicial restraint would seem dichotomous, at first glance, to 
the opposing concept of judicial activism in its role as a "federalizer," but a 
synthesis is meant here. Judicial restraint expresses an unwillingness to go 
outside the bounds that the Basic Law has set, whereas judicial activism implies 
ardent and uncompromising support of the Basic Law within those bounds. 50 
In order to understand these concepts as seen in case law, it is necessary to 
understand the judicial influence on federalism in West Germany. 
A. The FCC's Influence on Federalism 
The Basic Law explicitly recognizes judicial review of legislation and of con-
stitutional questions arising out of ordinary litigation.51 The FCC indeed decides 
the disputes about the rights, duties, and laws of the Bund and the Uinder.52 
The provision that allows this function constitutes an express written expansion 
of the American notion of judicial review. 
Judicial review in the West German system can be separated into several 
categories. First, controversies between the national government and states or 
units of the national government can be resolved by the FCC if brought to the 
court by an eligible federal organ or a state government. The FCC can enter 
the dispute only if there is real conflict and an interpretation of the Basic Law 
45Id. at 326. 
46Id. at 329. 
47 But see Nova, Political Innovation of the West German Federal Constitutional Court: The State of Discussion 
on Judicial Review, 70 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 114, 124 (1976). 
48 See, e.g., K. VON BEYME, supra note 41, at 185-89. 
49 Nova, supra note 47, at 124. See also Lowenstein, The Bonn Constitution and the European Defense 
Community Treaties, 64 YALE L.J. 805 (1955). 
50 For a general discussion of the FCC's general creativity balanced with pragmatism, see Markesinis, 
Conceptualism, Pragmatism, and Courage: A Common Lawyer Looks at Some Judgments of the German Federal 
Court, 34 AM. J. COMPo L. 349, 359-65 (1986). 
51 GG arts. 93, 100. 
52 GG art. 93(1), §§ 2-4. 
1989] FEDERALISM IN WEST GERMANY AND THE U.S. 71 
is needed.53 The Court additionally gives, "concrete judicial review," that is, a 
lower court may request the FCC's ruling on a constitutional question while the 
case is still pending in the lower court.54 The Court also is empowered to provide 
abstract judicial review, which is a decision initiated if there exist differences of 
opinion concerning a law's validity. The decision is not advisory in nature, but 
weighs equally with decisions made through the process of concrete review.55 
The FCC can be approached only by official agencies of government, with the 
exception of constitutional complaints by individuals. 
With such authority, the Court tried to fulfill the purpose of its establishment. 
One of those purposes was to defend the Basic Law, which included the defense 
of federalism. As the Court pursued this course during this early period, "ver-
tical separation of powers" [Bund-LanderJ as well as "the guarantee of the cultural 
identity and autonomy of the Lander" were preserved. 56 Scholars considered the 
Court a major defense against federal extension into Lander rightsY 
B. Southwest State Case 
The Southwest State Case in 1951 represented the first time the power of the 
Court was used to set aside legislation.58 By holding one law unconstitutional 
and another partially constitutional, the Court presented itself as a legitimate 
protector of the rights of the Lander.59 
The case arose prior to the Basic Law when three Lander drew up their own 
constitutions and proceeded to act like states. When a reorganization provision 
was included in the Basic Law, the Lander could not agree on how to organize 
themselves. The federal government, in accordance with provisions of the Basic 
Law, stepped in and passed reorganization laws for the three Lander. The first 
law provided an extension of existing terms upon which the Lander operated 
until the problem was settled, and the second created reorganization laws. One 
of the Lander, Baden, contested both laws and took the matter to the FCC.60 
The Court held that the extension of the terms was unconstitutional because 
the problem could have been handled by the Lander. The Court ruled that the 
statutes cannot be interpreted to negate fundamental constitutional principles 
of the Basic Law.61 One of the two principles involved was federalism. Federal 
53 KOMMERS. supra note 39, at 104. 
54 See Benda, Constitutional Jurisdiction in Western Germany, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1,3 (1981). 
55 KOMMERS, supra note 39. at 106. 
56/d. at 105. 
57 [d. 
58 Judgment of Oct. 23, 1951, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG], W. Ger., I Bundesverfassungs-
gerichtsentscheidungen [BVerfGEl 14. 
59 See Von Mehren, supra note 38, at 70-91. 
60 I BVerfGE at 20-24. 
61 [d. at 18. See also Von Mehren, supra note 38, at 86-87. 
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action violated this legal principle of the Basic Law because the Lander, though 
in disarray, continued to function constitutionally. Under article 72 of the Basic 
Law, the federal government can intervene, but only if the matter is beyond 
the competence of the Lander.62 
The Court also held that the reorganization laws were in part constitutional. 
The difference, in summary, between the constitutional and unconstitutional 
laws lay in the extent of infringement upon the rights of the Lander. Where the 
laws were necessary to aid the Lander, the laws were constitutional. Where the 
provisions forced the Lander to implement federal procedures, an exceSSive 
delegation of powers occurred, thus violating article 80. 
One scholar summarized the case as follows: 
The language and reasoning of the decision suggest that the court 
is consciously setting about to demonstrate its authority and provide 
the judicial ingredients needed for the development of a tradition 
of judicial review .... [T]he court did not limit itself to a discussion 
of whether territorial reorganization contemplated by article 118 of 
the Basic Law had begun so that federal action was authorized by 
that article. Instead, the court used the first law as a jumping off 
point for a discussion of two basic constitutional principles-de-
mocracy and federalism. In this the court's decision may suggest to 
the student of American constitutional law a certain parallelism with 
the approach and tone of Marshall's decision in Marbury v. Madison.63 
This case indeed set the tone for judicial review of Bund-Lander disputes. 
Federalism was defined as the concurrent use of power as outlined in the Basic 
Law. The significance of the FCC's concept of shared powers represented the 
Court's interpretation of a federation in more than name only, where the federal 
government acknowledges that the Lander are endowed with separate auton-
omy.64 
The case thus exemplifies not only that the FCC could interpret the meaning 
of federal supremacy over the Lander, but also that the Court envisioned an 
active federal structure within the borders of the Basic Law. This first case also 
showed the FCC as a legitimate constitutional organ within the federal structure. 
C. Concordat Case 
The Concordat Case in 1957 is another example of the FCC's role as a defender 
of the Lander.65 The dispute arose over the concordat between Hitler and the 
62 I BVerfGE at 17. 
63 Von Mehren, supra note 38, at 90. 
64 Leibholz, The Federal Constitutional Court in Germany and the" Southwest Case," 46 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 
723, 726 (1952). 
65 Judgment of Mar. 26, 1957, BVerfG, W. Ger., 6 BVerfGE 309. 
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Vatican allowing Catholic children to receive religious instruction in German 
schools. The agreement was called into question by the Land of Niedersachsen 
when it established a nondenominational educational system. The question 
before the Court was whether the Lander's jurisdiction over this area of com-
petence was subordinate to a treaty signed by the federal government.66 
The FCC upheld the Niedersachsen statute providing for equal education.67 
First, it held that educational responsibilities belonged to the Lander, and the 
federal government could not enter into a treaty involving the competence or 
obligations of the Lander. Next, the Court felt that the important "principle of 
federal comity [Bundestreue 1 must be relied upon to secure fulfillment, at the 
municipal level, of the obligations of the Bund at the internationallevel."68 The 
Court further suggested that federal comity was the best answer for such 
problems in the future.6g 
The impact of the decision was to strengthen the role of the Lander and force 
the Bund to cooperate with the Lander rather than impose treaty provisions on 
them. At the same time, the FCC "seems to have taken pains to limit the ensuing 
embarrassment for the Bund government in its conduct of foreign affairs gen-
erally .... "70 The Court's reasoning was that the Bund could not extend its 
power into situations where it had no authority. Since it had no authority over 
education, the Lander, the Court ruled, had no obligation to abide by the Bund's 
treaties.7l The Court thus defined federalism here in terms of authority over 
certain functions and obligations. If the authority did not exist, the govern-
mental level could not extend itself to an area outside of its competence. Even 
at the expense of international embarrassment and perceived weakness in in-
ternational relations, the Court was ready to enforce meticulously the vertical 
separation of powers. 
D. The Television Case 
Perhaps no case on federalism showed the FCC's strident effort to uphold 
what it interpreted as a main purpose of the Basic Law as did the Television Case 
of 1961.72 This was the first time the Court made a decision which could 
potentially bring it into direct conflict with the policy of an executive. By 
deciding against the Adenauer government, the Court took on the challenge 
66 6 BVerfGE at 310. 
67 6 BVerfGE at 311. This case should be contrasted with the earlier analysis of Martin v. Hunter's 
Lessee. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text. 
68 McWhinney, Judicial Restraint and the West German Constitutional Court, 75 HARv. L. REV. 5, 23 
(1961-1962). 
69Id. at 24-25. 
70 McWhinney, supra note 68, at 22. 
71 Kauper, supra note 43, at 1149. 
72 Judgment of Feb. 28, 1961, BVerfG, W. Ger., 12 BVerfGE 205. 
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admirably.73 The decision checkmated the endeavors of the federal government 
to gain control over television.74 
The dispute arose when the federal government created a private corporation 
for the purpose of gaining a controlling interest in West German television. 
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer attempted to get Lander approval by offering 
them shares in the company. but then proceeded without their approval. Several 
of the Lander took the matter to the FCC. The Lander argued, first, that all 
rights not expressly given to the federal government remained in the states, 
according to article 30. Second, the Lander argued that article 5 allowed for 
freedom of information from a "generally accessible source. "75 The Bund argued 
in reply that under article 73, paragraph 7, which gives the Bund exclusive 
authority to legislate on telecommunication matters, the proposed corporation 
was constitutional. 76 
The FCC narrowly interpreted article 73 by concluding that it referred only 
to technical requirements of television stations and not to their establishment.77 
It further held that there was a violation of the two principles raised by the 
Lander because the Basic Law does not provide for such activities by the federal 
government and, in fact, guards against it.78 
Federalism, in the sense formulated by this case, necessarily included obli-
gations on the part of the Lander and the Bund. The Bund could not legislate 
in the areas of competence belonging to the Lander, and the Bund had an 
obligation to restrain itself from attempting to do so. The Court stressed a sense 
of political morality involved in the federal relationship: "[T]he obligation of 
self-restraint in a federal society is a reciprocal one, involving both [the federal 
government] and the Lander."79 
The Television Case showed the FCC's judicial activism in defining its inter-
pretation of the Basic Law and rejecting a loose interpretation which approved 
of the national government's attempted expansion of powers. Once again the 
Court was giving "continuing judicial recognition of the importance of the states 
in the Federal system."80 
E. Summary 
In each of the previous cases, the FCC consistently adhered to its purpose of 
interpreting the Basic Law to protect the federal structure. While recognizing 
"' McWhinney. supra note 68. at 30. 
74 Rupp. The Federal Constitutional Court and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. 16 ST. 
LOUIS V.L.J. 359. 379 (1971-1972). 
75 12 BVerfGE at 207-10. 
76 [d. at 213. 
77 [d. at 207. 
, 78 Rupp. supra note 74. at 380. 
79 McWhinney. supra note 68. at 33. 
80 Cole, supra note 44. at 333. 
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the supremacy of federal law, the Court's contribution was to protect the rights 
and responsibilities of the Lander and interpret federal supremacy in a narrow 
manner when such rights and responsibilities were in danger of encroachment. 
The case law discussed provides support for the proposition that the FCC 
protected the Lander's rights during this early period. The Southwest State Case 
laid the foundation for a fertile concept of federalism and legitimized the Court 
in the process. The Concordat Case allowed federalism to branch out into obli-
gations on the part of the Bund and the Lander, especially the Bund, to exercise 
self-restraint and preserve the federal structure. Finally, in the Television Case, 
the FCC withstood the attempts of an active national government and upheld 
the Lander's areas of competence with a more narrow interpretation of the 
Bund's powers. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
These two case studies of the role of the federal judiciary in the early devel-
opment of federalism indicate some similarity of roles, but with varying effects 
on the development of federalism. In the case of the Federal Republic, the FCC 
sought to limit the power of the national government vis-a-vis the Lander. In 
the United States, the Supreme Court's decisions were designed to expand such 
a role. The question, then, must be asked: what factors in the contexts of these 
two systems affected the two Courts' roles in the development of federalism to 
produce similar judicial activist roles, but diverging directions in the federal 
relationship? 
A. Judicial Review 
One factor may be the distinct approaches of the two political systems with 
regard to the principle of judicial review. The principle of judicial review was 
generally accepted by the Framers of the Constitution. Their experience with 
the doctrine dated from Coke's statement in Bonham's case that an act of 
Parliament can be voided.8' By 1787, actions of some state legislatures had made 
the Framers wary of legislative omnipotence, especially in a national legislative 
body.82 The Framers also were aware of decisions of several state courts in the 
1780s declaring state acts to be unconstitutional.83 In The Federalist, Hamilton 
wrote that the Supreme Court would have the power to decide between con-
tradictory laws and invalidate those in conflict with the Constitution.84 Berger 
has concluded that the delegates to the state ratifying convention took for 
granted the possession of the power by the new federal courts.85 
81 R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 23 (\969). 
82 [d. at 3\-34. 
8' [d. at 38-46. 
84 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton). 
85 See R. BERGER, supra note 81, at \20-43. 
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In contrast, the concept of judicial review familiar to the Framers had a much 
more brief historical development in the Federal Republic of Germany. Judicial 
review was not formally granted to a German court until 1949.86 During the 
Reich confederation under Bismarck, disputes between the national and sub-
national governments were to be arbitrated by the Bundesrat. 87 During the 
Weimar Republic, that task was assigned to a newly established High Court of 
State, the Staatsgerichtshof, but without the authority to question a statute's con-
stitutionality. The German Supreme Court, the Reichsgericht, during the Weimar 
Republic did assume the power of judicial review in 1925 on the reasoning that 
the constitution nowhere expressly prohibited it. The Court, however, remained 
independent for only eight more years, and the right of appeal on a constitu-
tional issue to the Reichsgericht was limited.88 Hence, judicial review in the 
German judicial system is more a product of non-German thinking than native 
historical development. The authors of the Basic Law reviewed the powers and 
activities of other supreme judicial bodies, especially those of the U.S. Supreme 
Court.89 
Grafting the concept of judicial review into the West German system, which 
was largely unfamiliar with it, was more problematic than anticipated. The 
justices of the FCC realized this problem and used more restraint because of 
the novelty of their role. Though judicial review clearly lay within its power, 
only three federal statutes were ruled unconstitutional during the first six years 
of the Court's existence.9o In the Concordat Case, for example, the FCC over-
turned neither the treaty nor the Lander statute, but acted cautiously to avoid 
embarrassing the Bund in its foreign affairs conduct.91 
In the cases involving federalism, the FCC exercised more restraint in its 
judicial review than its American counterpart. In the United States, the Supreme 
Court was willing to make broad use of vague constitutional clauses to overturn 
state legislation and, on one occasion during this period, federal legislation. 
The FCC, in contrast, interpreted the already specific Basic Law narrowly, not 
only in determining its own role in judicial review, but also in deciding the 
merits of cases. Consequently, in cases relating to federalism, the FCC pursued 
a more cautious approach, focusing on maintenance of the Basic Law and 
prevention of imbalance by expansion of powers on the part of either the Bund 
or the Lander. Since the Bund actively sought such expansion, the FCC's caution 
more often restrained the central government. The more general acceptance 
86 See P. BLAIR, FEDERALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW IN WEST GERMANY 1-13 (1981). 
871d. 
88 Leibholz, supra note 64, at 731. 
89 Cole, The West German Constitutional Court: An Evaluation After Six Years, 20 J. POL. 278, 280 (1958). 
90ld. at 289. 
91 McWhinney, supra note 68, at 22. 
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of judicial review within the American system, on the other hand, enabled the 
Supreme Court to take bolder action in maintaining and expanding federal 
powers. 
B. Specificity of the Written Constitution 
The specificity of the written constitution also affected the roles of the two 
Courts in the development of federalism. The Constitution, a vaguely worded 
document compared to the more specific and more detailed Basic Law, provided 
the Supreme Court with greater flexibility in interpretation than that accorded 
to the FCC. The Supreme Court was impelled to interpret and apply vague 
clauses to changing conditions. Thus, the Supreme Court was able to playa 
larger role in providing flesh and blood to those clauses referring to federalism. 
Given the Court's propensity toward the central government, this capability 
fostered the expansion of federal powers at the expense of the more powerful 
states. 
The FCC, on the other hand, was less able to affix broad interpretations to 
specific phrases and was not required to interpret the document in light of 
substantially changed conditions.92 For example, there is no provision for im-
plied powers given in favor of the Bund, such as the necessary and proper clause 
found in the Constitution. The FCC, therefore, was less willing to confer any 
unwritten power on the Bund or the Lander because the Basic Law is so specific 
otherwise.93 
C. Constitutional Amendment Process 
The constitutional amendment process in the Federal Republic also limited 
the role of the FCC in adjudicating and broadly interpreting clauses concerning 
federalism. Amendments to the Basic Law need only a two-thirds majority of 
the Bundestag and Bundesrat for ratification. The Constitution specifies a two-
thirds majority in Congress plus the approval of three-fourths of the state 
legislatures. The relative ease of the West German amendment procedure has 
made it a feasible alternative to the judicial system for settling disputes between 
the Lander and the Bund. In the first thirty years of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the Basic Law was amended thirty-four times, mostly to settle Bund-
Lander disputes. 94 In this early period, in only one instance was the Constitution 
amended in response to a Supreme Court decision related to federalism.95 The 
92 P. BLAIR, supra note 86, at 34. 
93 [d. at 114, 117. 
94 [d. at 211. 
95 The case, Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 u.s. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), involved the federal judicial power 
over suits against a state commenced by citizens of another state. The decision upholding such power 
was overturned by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1798. 
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difficult U.S. amendment process and general public unwillingness to tamper 
with the document have increased dependence on the Supreme Court for 
conflict resolution. 
The ready availability of the constitutional amendment process also may have 
led the FCC to more narrowly based interpretations under the reasoning that 
its decisions could more easily be overturned through the amendment process. 
For example, the FCC's decision in the Residence Tax Case was later overturned 
by a 1969 amendment.96 The frequent occurrence of such reversals threatened 
to diminish the prestige of the FCC. The Supreme Court's decisions, on the 
other hand, have rarely been overturned by the constitutional amendment 
process. 
D. Relative Strength of the National-Subnational Governments 
Another contextual factor explaining the differences in the roles of the Courts 
is the relative strength of the national and sub national governments in the 
federal relationship. During its early years, the U.S. national government was 
viewed as the lesser partner in the federal relationship.97 The states had older, 
more established governments. They were more strongly identified with the 
people.98 In sum, they acted in their own spheres largely separate from the 
central government and each other in a structure commonly referred to as dual 
federalism. 99 The new federal government even had to rely on the states for 
certain of its own functions, such as the election of Senators and the President. loo 
Marshall and others on the Supreme Court envisioned a strong, effective 
national government possessing the power to act decisively and directly on the 
people. Marshall saw the Supreme Court's role as one of fulfilling the Framers' 
intent, expanding and solidifying the national government's power vis-a-vis the 
states to overcome the national government's weakness. lol The Supreme Court's 
decisions on federalism issues reflected this frame of mind. 
In West Germany, the national government was not in need of strengthening 
relative to the Lander. The Basic Law provided for a strong Bund clearly superior 
to the Lander.102 The first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Konrad Adenauer, was a strong executive who used his personal influence and 
96 P. BLAIR, supra note 86, at 252. 
97 THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (j. Madison). 
98 THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (j. Madison). 
99 See E. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT: A HISTORY OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY 47-48 (1934). For an alternative view, see Grodzins, Centralization and Decentralization, in A 
NATION OF STATES (R. Goldwin ed. 1963). 
100 U.S. CON ST. art. I, § 3; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
101 E. CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION 34-35,122, 145, 198 (1919). 
102 GG art. 31. 
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the machinery of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) to expand Bonn's 
power throughout the nation and the Chancellor's power within the Bund. I03 
Unlike the Supreme Court, the FCC did not face a situation where the 
national government was widely perceived as needing increased strength vis-a-
vis the subnational governments. On the contrary, the FCC saw its role as 
protector and defender of the Basic Law, including the federal structure which 
it had created. 
Since the encroachment by the Bund would reduce the powers of the Lander 
and violate the Basic Law's federal design, the FCC saw its role as defender of 
the Lander's rights as inviolate under the Basic Law. The Court became, in the 
words of one scholar, a "federalizer."lo4 In fact, the FCC's decisions made federal 
politicians hesitant even to approach the FCC to resolve their differences with 
the Lander. 105 
E. The Court in National Government 
Not only were both Courts concerned about the balance of the federal rela-
tionship in their respective systems, but also they sought to vivify the constitu-
tional powers assigned to their respective institutions. For both the FCC and 
the Supreme Court, the early periods of their respective histories were crucial 
to their development as equal branches of the national government. 
Both Courts were recognized as historically the weakest branches of their 
respective national governments. In The Federalist, Hamilton wrote that of the 
three branches of the national government, the Supreme Court "will be the 
least in a capacity to annoy or injure [political rights]."106 An appointment to 
the Supreme Court in its first years was not a highly desired post. The FCC's 
weakness grew from the novelty of a powerful judiciary and the subordinate 
role West German courts had played in the past. 107 Moreover, the FCC was 
subject to the administrative and budgetary authority of the Ministry of Justice. 
The FCC spent its first decade successfully asserting its administrative and 
budgetary independence. lOS 
Therefore, both Courts needed to assert their authority to gain respect as 
equal organs in the national government. Each, however, employed unique 
means to achieve that common goal. The Supreme Court asserted its authority 
by establishing its power of judicial review, in Marbury v. Madison, and its role 
103 A. HEIDENHEIMER, ADENAUER AND THE CDU: THE RISE OF THE LEADER AND THE INTEGRATION OF 
THE PARTY 243 (1960). 
104 Cole, supra note 44. at 333. 
\05 D. KOMMERS, supra note 39, at 164. 
\06 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (A. Hamilton) (c. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
\07 See Lowenstein, supra note 49, at 838. 
\08 D. KOMMERS, supra note 39, at 83-85. 
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as arbitrator of national-state disputes, in McCulloch v. Maryland. By abandoning 
a strict constructionist role and asserting its power to invalidate state and federal 
laws, the Supreme Court made clear that it would not play merely a limited 
role in relation to the other two branches and the states. 
While the Supreme Court gradually gained respect from the public and 
political leaders by broadly interpreting its own role, such a method had less 
utility for the FCC. The powers of the FCC were more clearly defined. Early 
on, however, the FCC was compelled to assert itself as a legitimate constitutional 
organ alongside the executive and the legislature. The Basic Law did not grant 
it such a role, but the implementing legislation of 1951 stipulated that the FCC 
was "an autonomous court of the Federation independent of all other institu-
tional organs."I09 The FCC, however, had to fight for autonomy from the 
Ministry of Justice and control over its own budget. The FCC had to gain the 
public acceptance and recognition of its role as the arbitral power between the 
other constitutional organs and between the Bund and the Lander.lIO 
The FCC sought that respect through defending the provisions of the Basic 
Law and by exercising caution and avoiding political issues as much as possible. 
Indeed, the FCC's caution is evident in the case involving the legality of the 
Communist Party, which was delayed for five years with the hope of avoiding 
the Court's decision. llI The FCC sought to increase respect for itself by exer-
cising judicial restraint and enhancing the image of a fair, impartial, and cau-
tious body. Judicial activism was to be used only in defense of the provisions of 
the Basic Law, not to go beyond it. 
Since the Supreme Court favored expansion of the national government, the 
assertion of the Court's authority produced decisions increasing its role in 
federal conflict resolution and in cases involving the power of the national 
government vis-a-vis the states. The FCC asserted its authority by affirming its 
independence from the Adenauer government and defending the Basic Law 
from encroachment by the active national government. 
F. Federal Comity 
A final difference between the FCC and the Supreme Court is the presence 
of national-subnational cooperation and respect in the political culture. Though 
not specifically defined in the Basic Law, the concept of federal comity has been 
a guiding principle in FCC decisions. The FCC has derived federal comity from 
the nature of the political system and has concluded that even a lawful power 
may be restricted if found to be in conflict with the rights of the Lander.ll2 
109 /d. at 83. 
110 McWhinney, supra note 68, at 12. 
III Id. at 12-13. 
112 D. KOMMERS, supra note 39, at 210,236. 
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Federal comity denotes cooperation between the government levels in the 
form of concern for each other's interests and negotiation to resolve differences. 
Federal comity mandates a cooperative rather than conflicting relationship be-
tween the two governmentallevels. 1I3 
Since 1949, in the spirit of federal comity, the Bund and the Lander have 
signed agreements over disputed areas of jurisdiction under the Basic Law. 
Some of these agreements have included temporary transfers of powers from 
the Bund to a Land or vice versa. One example is the 1957 agreement between 
the Bund and North-Rhine Westphalia on Bund performance of Land respon-
sibilities for Bund waterways.l14 
Federal comity was not a legal principle known in early American political 
culture or legal thought, as it was not part of the common law. The two 
governmental levels were seen as governors over two separate spheres. 115 The 
national government was intended to carry out tasks that the states could not 
perform or that clearly did not belong within their sphere. The Constitution 
was designed to allow the federal government to be effective in its own sphere, 
not to establish cooperation between the federal government and the states. 
The conflict or adversarial relationship was assumed quickly and dominated the 
early period of American federalism. 
In the Federal Republic, the presence of federal comity was important in 
determining the FCC's role because it legitimized Bund-Lander negotiations and 
reduced the number of disputes actually taken to the Court. The absence of a 
federal comity concept in the United States may have had the opposite result. 
The lack of comity channeled conflict through the legal process, enhancing the 
Supreme Court's role. 
This concept also affected the nature of both Courts' decisions on federalism. 
The FCC sided with the Lander, thus forcing the Bonn government to cooperate 
with the Lander rather than to act independently. In the Television Case, for 
example, the Bund was prevented from violating federal comity by proceeding 
with the network alone and was forced to cooperate with the Lander in the 
establishment of another network. 116 The FCC decision was designed to main-
tain comity rather than displace it. 
In the United States, the Supreme Court was faced with an either-or decision 
without the benefit of being able to follow the general principle of federal 
comity. The Supreme Court was compelled to choose sides. Given the danger 
of centrifugation through strengthening of state powers during this early pe-
riod, the Court sided with the national government time after time. The exis-
Il3 P. BLAIR, supra note 86, at 164-65. 
114Id. at 221. 
115 K. WHEARE, supra note 1, at 4-5. 
116 P. BLAIR, supra note 86, at 202-04. 
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tence of federal comity in the U.S. system probably would have advantaged the 
states since the federal government constituted the weaker partner and the 
states would have been treated as equal partners in cooperation. The establish-
ment of federal supremacy probably would have developed over a more lengthy 
period. 
V. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS 
The influence of the FCC and the Supreme Court did not remain unchanged 
within their respective federal systems beyond these early periods. A brief 
discussion of the development of federalism and the two Courts' roles subse-
quent to these early periods may shed light on the continuance of the diver-
gences and similarities between the two systems. 
Subsequent to this early period, the Supreme Court continued to exercise 
judicial review, albeit with caution, for a century. The Marshall Court invalidated 
only eighteen state laws. Though the justices employed judicial review to weigh 
the constitutionality of state actions, only infrequently did they actually void 
state law. The Marshall Court acted with prudence in asserting its power in the 
face of intense criticism of its decisions, particularly by Republicans. The practice 
of judicial review, however, was not seriously challenged subsequent to this 
period. In fact, the Supreme Court successfully asserted its authority. For exam-
ple, from 1836 to 1910 the Court overturned 152 state laws. ll7 An explosion 
occurred following the adoption of a significant doctrine concerning state law 
laid down by the Court in Mugler v. Kansas and other related cases.ll8 
If ... a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public 
health, the public morals or the public safety, has no real or sub-
stantial relation to these subjects, or is a palpable invasion of rights 
secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so 
adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution. 119 
The decision allowed subsequent courts to use the due process clause as a 
substantive as well as a procedural brake on state power. 120 Between 1910 and 
1980, the Court voided 721 state laws. 121 As judicial review has expanded in 
scope generally, it has extended the Supreme Court's ability to act as arbiter in 
federalism-related cases. 
The FCC's early period was primarily a period of judicial caution in exercising 
its power of review on constitutional issues. Subsequently, however, the FCC 
117 D. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 43 (1986). 
118 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
119 [d. at 661. 
120 J. SCHMID HAUSER, supra note 20, at 102-03. 
121 D. O'BRIEN, supra note 117, at 43. 
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became more active in invalidating statutory provisions. 122 Kommers has docu-
mented a significant increase in invalidations of statutory provisions at the 
national and subnational levels by the FCC in concrete judicial review cases 
during the 1960s.123 The FCC also has been more willing to substitute its own 
judgment for that of other governmental bodies.'24 For example, the Bundestag 
approved a statute providing state subsidies for any party receiving at least 2.5 
percent of the federal vote. The FCC, in a later decision, ruled that the figure 
of 0.5 percent was more equitable. 125 The FCC also has indicated to legislators 
beforehand the type of legislation it would approve. Additionally, the FCC has 
been bold enough to impose time limits within which the Bund must resubmit 
legislation the FCC has disapproved. 126 
The FCC's period of adjustment to the application of judicial review was 
much briefer than that of the Supreme Court and allowed the FCC to acquire 
an activist role more rapidly in the development of federalism. In both systems, 
subsequent practice of judicial review achieved a nationalizing effect. 
The Basic Law in West Germany contains a more detailed base from which 
to begin judicial review, thus also creating barriers for broad interpretation. 127 
This is not the case in the United States. The ambiguous phraseology of some 
sections of the Constitution, which enabled the Supreme Court in the early 
years to play the role of interpreter, also secured the role as reviser for the 
Court in subsequent years. Armed with the power to interpret the Constitution, 
the Supreme Court has been allowed, even encouraged in some circles, to 
reinterpret the Constitution in order to meet changing social, economic, and 
political conditions. The most dramatic example is the shift of the Supreme 
Court's direction in 1937 when the Justices redefined the federal power aver 
commerce, taxing, and spending. The continuation of the debate over whether 
the Justices should determine the Framers' intent, however, is evidence of the 
lack of consensus on this issue. 
Nevertheless, in relation to federalism, the effect of such vagueness has been 
a continuation of the Supreme Court's role of defining and redefining the 
federal relationship. The shifts from dual federalism to cooperative federalism 
to creative federalism have been upheld by a Supreme Court restructuring 
intergovernmental relations to fit current needs. 
As discussed earlier, the vague wording of the Constitution and the Supreme 
Court's favoritism towards the cehtral government resulted in pro-national 
122 D. KOMMERS, supra note 39, at 214-15. 
123 [d. at 215. 
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decisions during the early period. The Supreme Court did subsequently tilt 
somewhat toward state autonomy in the middle of the nineteenth century. In 
the long term, however, the equivocal nature of constitutional phrasing has 
increased the power and role of the central government. Not only has history 
demonstrated such a bias, but the inherent role of the Supreme Court as 
interpreter mandates such a bias. In other words, the expectation that the 
Supreme Court will redefine the Constitution to meet existing situations has 
preempted the alternative role of an arbiter expected to enforce rigidly the 
terms of the original document. Such an alternative would have advantaged the 
states since the states held greater power at the time of the framing of the 
document. 
The specificity of the Basic Law limits broad interpretation of the document, 
but the differences between the West German and U.S. judicial systems in their 
reliance on precedent and agreement on the state of the law favor broader 
interpretive ability by the FCC. These differences also have influenced the 
federal relationship. The West German system places relatively less emphasis 
on the principle of stare decisis. The decisions of the FCC follow closely the 
precedents set earlier. This behavior is probably attributable to the sense of 
federal comity that exists in the West German judicial psyche and, as Kommers 
suggests, the FCC is not likely to survive by initiating constitutional revolutions 
through dramatic changes in doctrine. 128 The FCC, however, possesses more 
flexibility than the Supreme Court. 
The FCC, moreover, is permitted to look to the state of society in deciding 
constitutional questions. 129 Thus, West German courts tend to create a picture 
of the present state of the law. Specifically, the FCC can look to principles of 
practical reason, recognized general ideas of justice, interpretation of statutory 
norms, social conditions, and sociopolitical views. 13o 
The impact on federalism stems from the FCC's ability to consider additional 
factors beyond the intent of the Basic Law in serving as judicial arbiter. In more 
recent times, the movement of domestic public policy problems to the central 
government has eroded the role of the Lander. The FCC has been cognizant of 
this nationalization process and has not acted as a reactionary body to suppress 
it. 
The difficulty of the U.S. amendment process, which increased dependence 
on the Supreme Court for conflict resolution during the early period, has 
remained unchanged and has provided the Supreme Court with a high degree 
of safety from being overruled by amendment. The failure of the attempt in 
128 D. KOMMERS, supra note 39, at 208-09. 
129 See Lahav, The Art o[Comparative Constitutional Law, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 697, 699 (1980). 
130 See Aldisert, Rambling Through Continental Legal Systems, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 935, 957 (1982). 
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the early 1960s to nullify the reapportionment cases serves as an example. 131 
The continued difficulty of the amendment process has maintained the Su-
preme Court's role as arbiter of federalism and reduced the states' ability to 
blunt pro-national Court decisions. In West Germany, on the other hand, the 
breadth of the Basic Law and the relative ease with which amendments to the 
Basic Law are passed have continued to make the FCC less of a force politically 
than its U.S. counterpart. 
The Marshall Court attempted to effect a balance in favor of the weaker 
partner in the federal partnership. Subsequently, the Supreme Court reacted 
to federalism questions cognizant of the relative strength of the federal partners. 
After Marshall, the Court attempted to shift the pendulum back towards the 
states to offset the pro-national Marshall Court decisions.132 The Supreme 
Court, however, never overruled the broad dicta laid down by the Marshall 
Court in the significant federalism cases of the early period. By the 1930s, in 
light of the severe economic crisis and the ensuing political crisis for the insti-
tutions, the Supreme Court tipped the balance in favor of the national govern-
ment. 
In the Federal Republic, the relative strength of the national and subnational 
governments affected the FCC's decisions regarding federalism. Primarily, the 
perceived need for Bonn to be empowered to address the nation's economic 
and social problems influenced the FCC's subsequent nationalistic decisions. 
The Supreme Court's role in the national government continued to affect 
the Court's role as arbiter of federalism. The Dred Scott decision and its after-
math diminished the Supreme Court's role in national government. The un-
equivocal rejection of that decision politically and militarily through the Civil 
War and constitutionally by means of the Civil War Amendments lessened the 
Supreme Court's authority in political conflict resolution. 
The Supreme Court's weakness resulted in judicial caution in the exercise of 
its federal arbiter role. The Supreme Court moved cautiously to res~ore the 
role of the states in the federal system. 133 This caution is reflected in the 
inconsistency of the Court's decisions on federalism issues immediately following 
the Civil War.134 Had the Court not been so restrained, however, perhaps the 
federal arbiter role could have been dispatched with more vigor. Perhaps the 
Court could have acted more forcefully in parrying congressional intrusions on 
state autonomy. 
1" Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). For a discussion of 
the override attempts, see Waters, Reapportionment: The Legislative Struggle, in REPRESENTATION AND 
MISREPRESENTATION 141-67 (C. Pritchett ed. 1968). 
132 See Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U.S. (II Pel.) 257 (1837); Charles River Bridge v. Warren 
Bridge, 36 U.S. (II Pel.) 420 (1837); City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (II Pel.) 102 (1837). 
133 See J. SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note 20, at 80-94. 
1341d. at 94-96. 
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The next major challenge to the Supreme Court's role in national government 
was the infamous court-packing attempt in 1937. With apparent popular sup-
port for New Deal legislation among political leaders and the general public, 
the Supreme Court faced the prospect of institutional decline if the Congress 
and the President had succeeded in altering the composition and, more impor-
tantly, the philosophical direction of the Court by legislative fiat. Two of the 
Justices, particularly, took steps to reduce the tension between political institu-
tions and preserve the independent role of the Court. 135 The effect of their 
actions on federalism was to broaden federal power and slacken judicial fetters 
on the states' powers of economic regulation. 
Even when the Supreme Court has not been faced with a direct threat to its 
role as a coequal institution in national government, the potential of such a 
challenge constrains the Justices' reaction to federalism issues. Too much de-
viation from public opinion on the federal partnership may prompt negative 
reaction and efforts to limit the Supreme Court's role. Avoidance of such 
deviation is not an entirely passive phenomenon, as indicated by the 1937 shift. 
Recent attempts to limit the Court's jurisdiction on busing cases and to overturn 
the abortion decisions, though currently unsuccessful, illustrate the continued 
tenuousness of the Court's position in national government. 
The FCC, on the other hand, has not experienced such crises in its role as 
an organ of national government. There have been no threats to overhaul the 
FCC and its powers. 136 Indeed, one West German scholar termed conflict similar 
to the 1930s fight over the American court "unthinkable" in West Germany.137 
Moreover, noncompliance with FCC rulings by the Bund or the Lander is quite 
rare. 138 The FCC, in fact, has probably enhanced its role where various parties 
have turned political questions into constitutional ones. Also, since the early 
period, the FCC has been the beneficiary of legislation and amendments to the 
Basic Law recognizing its special status in the West German political system. 
For example, in a state of national emergency, the FCC's functions cannot be 
impaired. 139 According to Kommers, "no other judicial tribunal in German 
history has achieved the status or measure of independence that the Federal 
Constitutional Court currently enjoys."140 
Thus, the FCC's decisions concerning federalism are affected by a greater 
authoritative weight than was enjoyed by past German courts or by the Supreme 
Court. The FCC can speak with greater confidence on federalism issues knowing 
I35 H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES & PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF ApPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME 
COURT 209 (1985). 
136 Blair, Law and Politics in Germany, 26 POL. STUD. 348, 361 (1978) [hereinafter Law and Politics]. 
137 G. SMITH, supra note 124, at 189. 
138 D. KOMMERS, supra note 39, at 277. 
139Id. at 85. 
14°Id. at 86. 
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that resistance is rare and respect for the Court within the political system is 
high. Ironically, the Supreme Court's inability to avoid political questions ac-
tually carries with it the potential of diminishing respect as it is dragged into 
political battles. The combination of law and politics, however, has worked 
successfully in the West German system and has not resulted in a diminished 
constitutional court.!4! 
As stated earlier, federal comity was not a feature of the political culture 
during the early period of the U.S. federal system. Federal comity, however, 
has emerged as a significant element of the federal relationship in the United 
States. This intergovernmental respect and cooperation has emerged from sev-
eral gradual developments: the growth of grant programs, an increased federal 
role in economic and social regulation that has led to shared responsibility, the 
formation of subnational lobbying groups to affect national legislation, and the 
creation of various intergovernmental organizations. 142 
The acceptance of comity has been reflected in Supreme Court decisions. 
The Supreme Court, particularly since 1937, has generally supported federal-
state cooperative efforts. Elazar contends that such support existed even in the 
nineteenth century.143 Federal-state cooperation in the form of federal grants-
in-aid to states was approved by the Court in 1923. 144 The Supreme Court, 
however, has not returned to pre-1937 limitations on federal policy powers to 
encourage comity. Rather, the Supreme Court has been more willing to expand 
concurrent jurisdiction when it is not explicitly denied in the Constitution. 
Significant change has not occurred in federal comity as a legal concept in 
the West German system. The existence of federal comity has limited the need 
for the FCC to intervene in federalism issues. The Bund and the Lander perform 
an increasing number of joint tasks. Agencies from both levels of government 
cooperate to develop programs on policy in areas such as urban and regional 
economic development, education, and scientific research.!45 This intergovern-
mental respect and cooperation between the Bund and the Lander serves to 
reduce the number of cases referred to the FCC for conflict resolution. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study has been to demonstrate the effect of contextual 
factors on two constitutional courts' roles as judicial arbiters of the federal 
HI See Law and Politics, supra note 136, at 352-62. 
142 Two examples of the latter are the Delaware River Basin Commission and the Appalachian 
Regional Commission. For a discussion of some of these organizations, s~ M. DERTHICK, BETWEEN 
STATE AND NATION: REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 46-107 (1974). 
143 See generally D. ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP (1962). 
144 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
1451. EDINGER, WEST GERMAN POLITICS 255-56 (1%5). 
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relationship. This research indicates that in the early periods the two courts 
displayed divergent behavior on federalism. On some points, the two institutions 
reacted similarly. Both institutions were required to establish roles as coequal 
branches with other national bodies and assert roles as judicial arbiters of 
federalism. Both attempted to put into practice judicial review, though the 
Supreme Court faced an easier task. Both sought to provide power for the 
weaker partner in the federal relationship. Each of these similarities, however, 
resulted in contrasting policy on federalism. 
On other measures, the systemic features such as the difficulty of the amend-
ment process, the specificity of the constitution, and federal comity heightened 
divergences in the two Courts' roles and policies. A discussion of subsequent 
developments indicates these divergences became less pronounced. There still 
exist, however, uniquely West German and American characteristics in the role 
of the two Courts in the development of federalism. 
